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Abstract—Lattice-based cryptography is a quantum-safe al-
ternative to existing classical asymmetric cryptography, such as
RSA and ECC, which may be vulnerable to future attacks in the
event of the creation of a viable quantum computer. The efficiency
of lattice-based cryptography has improved over recent years, but
there has been relatively little investigation into hardware designs
of digital signature schemes. In this paper, the first hardware
design of the provably secure Ring-LWE digital signature scheme,
Ring-TESLA, is presented, targeting a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
The results better compactness of all previous lattice-based digital
signature schemes in hardware, and can achieve between 104-785
signatures and 102-776 verifications per second.
Keywords—lattice-based cryptography, digital signatures, post-
quantum cryptography, hardware security, FPGA.
I. INTRODUCTION
A digital signature scheme (DSS) is important for building
secure systems and is widely used in most real world security
protocols. Almost all currently used DSSs are based on the
hardness of the factoring problem (RSA) or the discrete
logarithm problem (DSA/ECDSA). With the potential advent
of a quantum computer in the not too distant future, current
asymmetric cryptography would be rendered insecure. Indeed,
quantum computers are expected to break all currently secure
instances of RSA and ECDSA in polynomial time. One
potential solution is to adopt the use of DSSs based on the
hardness of certain lattice problems which are assumed to be
resistant to quantum attacks.
Due to significant research advancements in recent years,
lattice-based schemes have now become viable alternatives to
existing asymmetric cryptography. There are several practical
proposals based on varying hard lattice-based problems, such
as the NTRU cryptosystem and and Ring-LWE [1], [2]. For
further background on practical lattice-based DSSs, the reader
is referred to a recent survey on the state-of-the-art [3].
Previous hardware designs of lattice-based DSSs, the GLP
scheme [4] and the BLISS scheme [5], demonstrate good
performance and outperform ECDSA and RSA. However,
significant hardware resources are consumed by the costly
discrete Gaussian sampler in the BLISS scheme. Additionally,
the schemes rely on extra security assumptions, which do not
offer the very appealing average-case to worst-case hardness
property offered by Ring-LWE. This quality renders all crypto-
graphic constructions based on it secure, under the assumption
that worst-case lattice problems are hard. Furthermore, for both
GLP and BLISS, their parameters are not chosen directly from
their security reduction, meaning their instantiations are not
provably secure.
An alternative lattice-based signature scheme, Ring-
TESLA [2], has been proposed which does not require discrete
Gaussian sampling during sign or verify, and offers average-
case to worst-case hardness with a tight security reduction
and a provably secure instantiation. A tight security reduction
implies the cryptoscheme is no easier to solve than its hardness
problem. Ring-TESLA competes well with GLP and BLISS
in software [2], but as yet no hardware designs exist.
This paper presents the first hardware designs of the Ring-
TESLA signature scheme. The proposed designs are compact,
targeting long-term security and low-area applications. The
paper is structured as follows: the Ring-TESLA scheme
is detailed in Section II. Section III outlines the proposed
hardware designs of the signature scheme and results are given
in Section IV.
II. IDEAL LATTICE-BASED SIGNATURES
Lattice-based cryptography is emerging as a promising
quantum-resistant alternative to ECC or RSA, and offers
efficient performance for both encryption and signatures. For
significant efficiency gains, ideal lattices are usually used
which allow for smaller key sizes and faster computations by
computing over a specific algebraic structure. The Ring-LWE
problem [6], commonly used in lattice-based cryptography, is
well studied and demonstrates strong computational hardness.
The most practical lattice-based DSSs are based upon the
Fiat-Shamir paradigm [3], such as the state-of-the-art BLISS
by Ducas et al. [1], which is based upon ideal lattices with
NTRU assumptions. NTRU cryptoschemes have existed for a
significant period of time, with the only current serious break
in NTRU-based schemes targeted NTRUSign [7]. However, the
hardness assumptions of NTRU is not related to the hardness
of worst-case lattice problems, a useful property of Ring-LWE
[8]. Accordingly, a lattice-based DSS based on the Ring-LWE
problem has been proposed by Akleylek et al. [2], named Ring-
TESLA. Ring-TESLA provides three appealing properties.
Firstly, Ring-TESLA provides a tight security reduction, a
provably secure instantiation, and worst-case hardness, which
is not provided by GLP or BLISS. Cryptoschemes that have
provably secure instantiations are considered stronger in the
sense of security [9], especially when non-tight cryptoschemes
have been shown to provide weaker security assurances [10].
Secondly, the Ring-TESLA Sign and Verify algorithms
do not require discrete Gaussian sampling, which is instead
Name of the scheme Parameters
Security 128-bits
Lattice dimension n 512
Modulus q, (log2(q)) 51750913,(26)
Weight of the challenge ω 19
Gaussian std. dev. σ 52
Dropped bits d 23
Error threshold L 2766
Sign/Verify thresholds B,U 222 − 1, 3173
Repetition rate 2.9
TABLE I: The 128-bit parameter set for Ring-TESLA.
computed during key generation, off-device. Discrete Gaussian
samplers are known to be susceptible to side-channel analysis
[11], [12], hence avoiding this on-device is advantageous. Ad-
ditionally, this also economises the overall hardware resources
used, for example, the discrete Gaussian sampling module
consumes ≈ 15% of the overall resources in for BLISS
hardware design [5].
Thirdly, Ring-TESLA competes well in terms of through-
put, with the other lattice-based signatures GLP and BLISS
in software, despite having larger input and output sizes [2].
The parameter set (Table I) provides 128-bit security. The
modulus is increased from q = 39960577 to q = 51750913,
as the security reduction with the original modulus caused a
slightly bigger security gap than expected1. The Ring-TESLA
schemes Signsk and Verifypk are outlined in Algorithms
1 and 2, with KeyGen(1n) carried out offline. The required
hardware modules for Sign and Verify are polynomial mul-
tiplication over Rq = Zq[x]/(xn + 1), addition/subtraction,
modular reduction, and hashing.
Algorithm 1 Signing Algorithm for Ring-TESLA
1: procedure SIGN(µ, a1, a2, s, e1, e2)
2: y
$← Rq,[B]
3: v1 ≡ a1y mod q, v2 ≡ a2y mod q
4: c = H(bv1ed,q, bv2ed,q, µ)
5: c = F (c)
6: z← y + sc
7: w1 ≡ v1 − e1c mod q, w2 ≡ v2 − e2c mod q
8: if [w1]2d , [w2]2d /∈ R2d−L or z /∈ RB−U then
9: Restart
10: return (z, c)
Algorithm 2 Verification algorithm for Ring-TESLA
1: procedure VERIFY(µ, z, c, a1, a2, t1, t2)
2: c = F (c)
3: w′1 ≡ a1z− t1c mod q, w′2 ≡ a2z− t2c mod q
4: c′ = H(bw′1ed,q, bw′2ed,q, µ)
5: if c = c′ and z ∈ RB−U then
6: return 1
7: else
8: return 0
Key generation firstly generates s, e1, e2 ← Dnσ , with e1
and e2 checked for validity [2]. Two Ring-LWE polynomials
are then calculated t1 ≡ a1s+ e1 mod q and t2 ≡ a2s+ e2
mod q as the scheme’s public-key (pk), with the polynomials
s, e1, e2 being the scheme’s secret-key (sk).
1The updated modulus is found on the Ring-TESLA homepage (https:
//tesla.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de/de/tesla/) and was verified with the authors.
To sign a message µ, a uniform polynomial y $← Rq,[B]
is generated for use in the calculation of the signature and
for validity checks. Firstly, it is used to calculate intermediate
polynomials v1 ≡ a1y mod q and v2 ≡ a2y mod q, which
are input into the hash function H(·) along with the message
data µ to output the bit-string c. An encoding function F :
{0, 1}κ → Bn,ω (as described in [13]) then maps this bit-
string to a LHW polynomial c, with ω 1 values and n − ω
0 values. The LHW polynomial c is then used to calculate
the signature z ≡ y + sc as well as the polynomials w1 ≡
v1−e1c mod q and w2 ≡ v2−e2c mod q which are used to
check the validity of a signature. The verification algorithm is
essentially equivalent to the signing algorithm without uniform
polynomial generation and the calculation of z.
III. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION
Two separate hardware designs for the Sign and Verify al-
gorithms in the Ring-TESLA DSS are proposed. The required
modules for both Sign and Verify are a polynomial multiplier, a
hash function and a low Hamming weight (LHW) multiplier.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposed hardware design of Ring-
TESLA Sign. The Verify design is adapted from the proposed
Sign hardware design.
A. Hardware components
Polynomial multiplication is the most expensive module
required in the proposed designs in terms of latency con-
sumption. The most commonly chosen method for modular
polynomial multiplication is the number theoretic transform
(NTT), which offers fast performance and incorporates the
reduction modulo q. However, it is costly in terms of hardware
resource usage and there are significant restrictions on the
parameter selection when a NTT multiplier is used. Alterna-
tively, traditional multiplication techniques can be employed to
carry out the polynomial multiplication operations, incurring
an additional latency cost. An additional modular reduction
module is therefore required.
In this design, the polynomial multiplication is carried
out using a variant of schoolbook multiplication, known as
Comba multiplication [14], which improves the performance
by combining carry handling and reducing write access to
memory. This multiplier type fits within the overall compact
design goal, unlike NTT. The Comba multiplier is particularly
suitable for the FPGA platform and exploits the fast arith-
metic within the DSP units [15]. The multiply-and-accumulate
(MAC) operations are computed within each DSP slice until
the inner products of the schoolbook multiplier are complete.
The modular reduction component uses the Barrett method
[16]. Any generic modulus can be used within Barrett re-
duction, with only one pre-computation is required. Two
multiplication units with a maximum of two subtractions are
needed in Barrett reduction [17]. In the proposed designs,
an individual Comba multiplier is reused to carry out the
modular reduction. The combination of Comba multiplication
and Barrett reduction create an overall modular multiplication
component, which multiplies polynomials over the ring Rq .
The SHA3 hash function, Keccak, is chosen as the random
oracle in the proposed Ring-TESLA designs, due to its speed
in hardware as well as its post-quantum security [18]. A LHW
Fig. 1: A block diagram of the proposed hardware design
for Ring-TESLA Sign SB-I, widths being 26-bits. The global
parameters a1 and a2 are stored in BRAM18.
polynomial multiplication module is also designed to compute
on the LHW output of the hash function. The LHW multiplier,
used in both Sign and Verify, uses the column-wise schoolbook
technique, since the LHW calculations only require a small
amount of shift and adds. Column-wise is preferred over row-
wise as it requires less storage.
B. Signing and Verifying Hardware Designs
Figure 1 shows the Sign hardware architecture for Ring-
TESLA. Two dual-port 18 Kb block RAMs (BRAM18) are
used to store the global constants a1,a2. An unrolled x32
Trivium component is used to generate uniform random bits
for the polynomial y $← Rq,[B], whose input, as well as
the input of the polynomial a1 and a2 is controlled by two
counters, which increment on the ready signal of the modular
multiplication component. The global constant polynomial
selection (a1 or a2) is controlled by the finite state machine.
Once each element of v1 and v2 is output from the modular
multiplication module, the d least significant bits of each are
stored in RAM for use in the hash function, where the full
values are also stored for use in the rejection stage.
The binary string output from the hash-function (c) is
input to the encoding function F (c), which outputs a LHW
polynomial c. This prior knowledge of a LHW polynomial
allows the use of a LHW polynomial multiplier, which only
computes values for non-zero elements. The discrete Gaussian
distributed (Dσ) secret-keys s, e1, e2 are also LHW since,
for instance, the probability a sample x ← Dσ also satisfies
x ∈ {−100, 100} (thus 6-7 bits in length) is around 95%.
The LHW polynomial c is an input into every LHW
computation. This includes the calculation of the ciphertext z,
and the variables used to accept or reject the signature, w1 and
w2. The LHW polynomial multiplier exploits the fact that the
hash output polynomial c has only ω = 19 elements equal to a
one, and n−ω = 493 zero elements. The same LHW multiplier
component is reused to calculate the polynomials z, w1, and
w2, sequentially. Once a coefficient is output from the LHW
multiplier, it is processed by the rejecter, which checks whether
its size is valid for output. Rejecting a signature element-wise
is preferable to minimise run-time.
The column-wise LHW module stores the secret-key values
(s, e1, and e2) in a single-port distributed RAM, and takes the
input c from the hash function. Then, for each element in s,
e1, and e2, the multiplier accumulates the inner products using
a MAC unit. Once each column-wise element is calculated, it
is added/subtracted to/from the corresponding values in v1,
v2, or y′, and the final values are checked with their rejection
conditions (Line 8 in Algorithm 1), where only the signature
z and hash-string c are stored. This approach is advantageous
since the rejection validity is calculated instantly and in parallel
to the next LHW element calculation.
The Sign and Verify FSM operates in two-stages and in
a pipelined fashion, due to the latency of the calculations
of v1 and v2. For the first signature, y is generated during
initialisation when the global constants are read in, with an
additional y′ polynomial (see Figure 1) generated during
the calculation of v1 and v2. Once these calculations have
finished, y is swapped with y′, so the calculations of v1 and
v2 for the next signature can begin again. This removes the
hashing and LHW calculations from the critical path and cycle
count, as well as savings for generating a new polynomial y.
Verify operates in a similar fashion to Sign. The
Comba/Barrett polynomial multiplier calculates a1z and a2z,
with z being stored in BRAM. The results are also stored
in RAM and are updated after subtraction with the LHW
calculations of t1c and t2c. The final results are input into
the hash function, where the signature is validated if the hash
value matches the hash-string input from the signature.
C. Optimised design for accelerated performance
There is a trade-off between the latency achievable by the
proposed Ring-TESLA hardware designs of Sign and Verify
and the associated hardware resource usage. The proposed
designs, named SB-I Sign and SB-I Verify, offer reduced
area consumption at the cost of additional latency. In these
designs, a standard Comba multiplier with one Barrett modular
reduction unit is employed. The Barrett modular reduction unit
is carried out in parallel while the Comba multiplier is used
to minimise latency of the modular multiplication unit. These
designs target low area applications, where there is a need for a
provably secure instantiation and/or reduced area consumption,
and where a slower performance may be acceptable.
The bottleneck in Ring-TESLA is polynomial multipli-
cation. Three additional designs SB-II, SB-IV, and SB-VIII,
are undertaken having two, four, and eight parallel Comba
multipliers, respectively. These parallelised designs utilise ex-
tra BRAM for a1 and a2 access. To minimise latency, in all
proposed designs only one modular reduction is employed,
running in parallel with the multiple Comba multiplier units.
The modulus in this scheme has a length of log2(q) =
26-bits. For each 26-bit multiplication, the Comba multiplier
occupies 2 DSP slices on the target Spartan-6 FPGA.
IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The proposed architectures are implemented using the Xil-
inx ISE Design Suite 14.7 synthesis tool. The target device is
a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA (S6 LX25). Table II shows the post-
place and route results for the proposed hardware designs of
Ring-TESLA Sign and Verify. These designs fit comfortably
on the low-end FPGA. As expected, the optimised designs of
SB-II, SB-IV, and SB-VIII have reduced latency in comparison
to SB-I, at the cost of additional area consumption. Results
indicate that up to 785 operations per second can be achieved
by the proposed designs, with an associated low area cost.
TABLE II: Post-place and route results of the proposed hardware designs for Ring-TESLA [2], with a summary of other DSSs,
including GLP-I [4], BLISS-I [5], RSA, and ECDSA (results taken from [3]).
Operation, Configuration Security Device LUT/FF/Slice BRAM/DSP MHz Cycles Ops/s
Ring-TESLA (Sign, SB-I) 128-bits S6 LX25 4447/3345/1257 3/6 190 1835540 104
Ring-TESLA (Sign, SB-II) 128-bits S6 LX25 4828/3790/1513 4/8 196 917771 214
Ring-TESLA (Sign, SB-IV) 128-bits S6 LX25 5071/3851/1503 4/12 187 458891 408
Ring-TESLA (Sign, SB-VIII) 128-bits S6 LX25 6848/5457/2254 4/16 180 229446 785
Ring-TESLA (Verify, SB-I) 128-bits S6 LX25 3714/3023/1172 3/6 188 1835540 102
Ring-TESLA (Verify, SB-II) 128-bits S6 LX25 3917/3253/1238 3/8 194 917771 212
Ring-TESLA (Verify, SB-IV) 128-bits S6 LX25 4793/3939/1551 3/12 186 458891 406
Ring-TESLA (Verify, SB-VIII) 128-bits S6 LX25 6473/5582/2103 3/16 178 229446 776
GLP (Sign, Schoolbook x3) 80-bits S6 LX16 7465/8993/2273 30/28 162 - 931
GLP (Verify, Schoolbook x3) 80-bits S6 LX16 6225/6663/2263 15/8 158 - 998
BLISS (Sign, NTT) 128-bits S6 LX25 7193/6420/2291 6/5 139 15864 8761
BLISS (Verify, NTT) 128-bits S6 LX25 5065/4312/1687 4/3 166 16346 17101
RSA (Sign) 103-bits V5 LX30 3237 slices 7/17 200 - 89
ECDSA (Sign) 128-bits V5 LX110 32299 LUT/FF pairs 10/37 139 - -
ECDSA (Verify) 128-bits V5 LX110 32299 LUT/FF pairs 10/37 110 - -
The proposed designs are compared to existing classical
DSSs currently used in practice (RSA/ECDSA), and similar
lattice-based cryptosystems (GLP/BLISS), as seen in Table
II. The Ring-TESLA results compare well with or better than
the classical hardware designs of RSA and ECDSA, in terms
of lower area consumption and operations per second.
The proposed designs significantly better existing lattice-
based DSSs in terms of area consumption. Ring-TESLA Sign
SB-I results show ≈ 45% FPGA slice reduction compared to
GLP and BLISS, with results for SB-II and SB-IV reducing
FPGA slice consumption to ≈ 34%. However, the results
have an increase in latency compared to GLP and BLISS.
The Ring-TESLA algorithms contribute to this comparative
increase in latency. More specifically, Ring-TESLA Sign
requires two full polynomial multiplications (for v1 and v2),
whereas at the same stage GLP and BLISS only require one.
The designs are also compact when considering the larger
operand size for Ring-TESLA (26-bits), compared to GLP
(23-bits) and BLISS (14-bits).
To conclude, the first hardware designs of the provably
secure Ring-TESLA signature scheme are proposed in this
research, targeting a low-cost Spartan-6 FPGA device. In the
context of design space exploration, using multiple parallel
Comba multipliers (plus a Barret modular reduction) instead
of an NTT was chosen for design compactness. The designs
fit comfortably on a low-end Spartan-6 FPGA, despite having
large memory requirements and computationally expensive
algorithms. It understandably lacks in throughput performance
compared to other lattice-based DSSs, but this is the trade-off
for the stronger security it provides. The proposed hardware
designs are practical for low-area or high security applications,
where tighter security reductions are desirable, at the cost of
a slower performance.
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